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Abstract 
This paper discusses how well major capital structure theories incorporate firm-level and 
institutional factors into short-term firm financing decisions in a specific context, that of a 
transition economy. Using a new dataset of non-financial companies quoted on the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange between 2007-2015, we argue that neither the trade-off nor the pecking 
order theories fully explain corporate debt policies in Poland. The results of dynamic panel 
data modelling highlight the importance of the strength of property rights and stock market 
capitalisation as driving forces behind corporate financing decisions. 
1. Introduction 
Dealing with the problem of access to external finance and budgetary 
constraints for loss-reporting state-owned companies were the core objectives of 
market reforms in transition economies (Dewatripont and Maskin 1995). While the 
latter may have been solved, at least to a degree, by elimination of cronyism between 
banks and firms, numerous institutional reforms did little to alleviate the problem of 
insufficient firm long-term financing in CEE countries. Poland, with its inefficient and 
underdeveloped markets, remains a perfect example of this. Seen through the western 
standards, corporate debt and equity markets have remained underdeveloped and 
inefficient: according to the latest data retrieved from the renown Global Financial 
Development Database1 (Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen, Levine 2012), stock market 
capitalization (understood as total value of all listed shares in a stock market) and 
domestic credit to private sector (understood as loans, purchases of nonequity 
securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for 
repayment) reached in 29.3% and 53.6% of GDP respectively. Even though these 
figures imply steady financial development in Poland since the 1990s, they still place 
it far behind the most advanced EU economies, such as Germany, where the credit to 
the private sector reached 77.95% and the total market capitalization exceeded 47% of 
gross domestic product in 2015.  
                                                             
* The authors wish to thank the Editor and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. 
An online appendix is available at: http://journal.fsv.cuni.cz/mag/article/show/id/1404 
1 We acknowledge that this paper is focused on the Polish economy, therefore the analytics of the National 
Bank of Poland would be most suitable, however, for the sake of comparability between Poland and other 
economies (e.g. Germany) mentioned in the introductory part of the text we resort to international databases. 
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The data also indicate that the development of financial markets in Poland 
occurred at the same time as a steady withdrawal of firms from external financing: 
while in 2009, 48.9% of all companies registered in Poland did not use external 
financing at all, in 2014 this figure rose to 64.3%. The withdrawal from external 
financing over the past decade seems to have been induced by firms themselves, as 
only 10.1% of loan applications made in 2014 were rejected. Moreover, small 
companies, whose access to external financing may be more limited, also turned to 
internal financing: in 2009 over 47% of such firms appeared to have a formal line of 
credit or a loan incurred at a financial institution, while in 2013, only approximately 
26%. In the same year, only 9% of working capital of all firms surveyed, their size 
notwithstanding, was financed by bank-originated loans. Indeed, the share of firms 
which financed their investments from bank loans decreased at from 40.7% in 2009 to 
30.6% in 2014. Polish businesses also reduced their use of open credit lines, from 
50.1% in 2009 to 31.6% five years later.  
Paradoxically, the data also suggest that access to external financing has 
become much easier for Polish firms, as, in 2009, 22% firms judged it as “difficult”, 
while in 2014, it was only 15.6% of the surveyed entities for whom it appeared 
problematic. A case can be made that perhaps it was either the financial crisis that 
reduced the number of firms operating in the market or companies, which already had 
significant debt burdens, decided to deleverage due to uneasy business environment 
and uncertain future.2 In the context of Poland, the so-called discouraged borrower 
problem and zero-leverage puzzle are discussed at length by Sawicka and Tymoczko 
(2014), whose evidence implied firstly that almost one in five Polish companies 
operated without any external financing, and secondly, that these firms usually enjoyed 
greater profitability and liquidity. While the limited credit use was often ascribed to 
short credit history (suggesting low creditworthiness) or inability to access finance via 
formal channels, the authors argued that the phenomenon was not an idiosyncrasy of 
Poland (or any transition economy for the matter) but a world-wide phenomenon.  
Despite dynamic and sometimes contradictory evidence in transition 
economies, theoretical and empirical research on corporate capital structure have long 
focused on developed economies (e.g. Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic 2001; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Myers, 
1977; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Wald, 1999). Although there has been a trend towards 
emerging economies, these studies are still limited by the paucity of data, both at the 
firm- and country-level. Recently, more papers on the contemporary situation in CEE 
countries have appeared, but few have discussed the Polish economy in detail, with the 
few studies available focusing on immediately after the transition process or 
generalised debt ratios (Nivorozkhin 2004; Delcoure 2007; Kędzior 2012; Jõeveer 
2013). 
Given that much of the available literature on the subject at hand is somewhat 
outdated, this paper forms a contribution by examining the interplay between 
institutional factors and firm financing decisions. We argue that the empirical studies 
that deal with the subject, focused as they are on the early transition period, are less 
                                                             
2 Political factors may have played a role, but they have been less important given the instability of the Polish 
political environment. However, Hasan et al. (2017) argued that the value of being politically-connected 
rose during the recent financial crisis, which may also have been the case in Poland. 
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relevant given that the institutional challenges in Poland were overwhelmed by the 
shock of transition. The progress that followed during the last two decades was more 
evolutionary than revolutionary in character, making it less desirable as a natural 
experiment but of more interest for “normal” firm functioning. Moreover, capturing 
institutional changes has remained problematic across economics, as the availability 
of internationally-comparable measures is still somewhat insufficient, especially in the 
case of economies such as Poland, for which long time-series data is often missing.  
Using a new dataset encompassing firm-level, institutional, and 
macroeconomic variables in the period 2007-2015, this study assesses whether major 
modern capital structure theories can be applied to public companies in Poland, and – 
if so – then how macroeconomic and institutional variables shape these firms’ debt 
policies across a number of proxies for debt. This paper’s comparative advantage over 
the existing studies is twofold: firstly, it provides a localised analysis of the current 
situation of Polish listed companies; and, secondly it offers an in-depth look at 
disaggregated short-term debt categorised according to the origin of its source. 
Moreover, we resort to various measures of institutional progress (including both 
objective continuous measures, such as contract-intensive money, and discrete 
subjective indicators), contributing to emergent field of quantitative institutional 
economics. To the best of our knowledge, such an approach has never been taken in 
the context of firm financing policies in modern-day Poland, so our research makes a 
novel empirical contribution both to the institutional and financial literature on the 
subject and policymaking decisions regarding modernization of institutional and 
company growth. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the following section 
provides a brief overview of relevant literature, Section 2 presents our data and 
econometric model. Section 3 offers preliminary insights regarding Poland’s 
institutional development and its impact in the period under consideration. Section 4 
presents the results of the analytics, while Section 5 provides brief conclusions and 
points the way to further research. 
2. Literature Review 
In this study we focus on the two most popular modern capital structure 
theories, the static trade-off theory and the hierarchy of financing sources theory. Seen 
from a current perspective, the word “modern” in the phrase “modern capital structure 
theories” seems misplaced, especially if we consider the fact that the majority of the 
most heavily-cited papers on the subject were produced in the last century. 
Nevertheless, we resort to these seminal papers as a starting point of our analysis before 
turning to more recent evidence. 
The static trade-off theory argues that firm financing structure is neutral vis-à-
vis firm value, with its predictions hinging on strong assumptions of market efficiency 
and non-existent taxation and agency costs. However, subsequent research has proven 
how these transaction costs do enter into firm decisions, with debt policy decisions 
associated with taxation and financial distress costs, agency problems, firm-specific 
and financial market features (Modigliani and Miller 1963; Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Myers 1977). 
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The hierarchy of financing sources, however, implies that debt be the last-resort 
source of financing, ignoring issues with equity or bank financing, including negative 
share price changes, limited dividend pay-outs to ensure higher cash flows, and 
rationed access to loans to mitigate the cost of capital (Myers and Majluf 1984). 
Despite these shortcomings, the hierarchy of financing theory is supported by a 
considerable body of empirical research such as Booth et al. (2001), Delcoure (2007), 
Kędzior (2012), and Joeveer (2013). Joeveer (2013), for example, explains the 
negative relationship between corporate debt and profits via information opacity 
between internal and external stakeholders, suggesting that debt is indeed a last-chance 
source of financing. 
These theories are often concentrate on firm-specific issues, but recent research 
also takes into account broader macroeconomic and institutional facets of an economy 
to describe firm financing decisions. These two aspects of the environment the firm 
faces, both internal and external, are examined below. 
2.1 Firm-Level Characteristics 
While modern capital structure theories present contrasting, if not directly 
conflicting, approaches to the influence of firm-level characteristics on corporate 
leverage, at times the two theories appear to complement each other. As Myers (2003) 
noted, different capital structure theories applied to firms depending on their 
circumstances, based on several firm-level factors (as shown in Harris and Raviv 
1991). In particular, firm size, collateral, liquidity, growth opportunities, tax- and non-
tax debt shields, and profitability all may alter the capital structure theory which is 
most appropriate for understanding a specific firm’s decisions. This reality appears to 
be exacerbated in the transition context, where firm-specific attributes take on added 
importance in an environment in flux. 
Firm size counts as a good example of this complementarity, as it may allow 
better access to external financing thanks to reduced information asymmetry enjoyed 
by large companies (Myers 1984); larger firms would then also appear to bear financial 
distress costs more easily. In transition economies, some companies are formerly state-
owned companies, and as such, their chances of acquiring government guarantees and 
credit providers treating them favourably could be increased. Firm size could also 
approximate firm maturity, as such also implying a lesser risk of a firm defaulting on 
its debts. 
These theoretical musings are underpinned by a considerable body of empirical 
evidence. For example, Delcoure (2007) argued that while the long-term leverage 
diminished with firm size, short and total debt appeared positively impacted by the size 
of a firm’s total assets. Her research thus provided proof that elevated informational 
opacity and institutional weaknesses reflected both in underdeveloped corporate bond 
markets and ineffective legal regulations. A conclusion naturally followed that the 
weak institutional setting during the early transition period created elevated risk levels, 
forcing companies to favour short-term sources of financing. 
Additionally, firm profitability is often mentioned in the presence of tax shields, 
whose attractiveness depends directly on the level of a firm’s taxable income. In the 
transition context, such an analysis should be extended by inclusion of two important 
facts: firstly, due to institutions being in the state of flux, financial distress costs are 
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more acute. These (often expected) costs are usually included by the creditors in the 
process of external financing, making it costlier. Secondly, profits are more volatile in 
such an environment, thus making tax shields less useful. Empirical research has 
yielded mixed results in this context: contrary to theory, Delcoure (2007) showed a 
positive impact of tax-related shields in the early transition periods while Bauer (2004) 
and Kędzior (2012) failed to provide conclusive and robust evidence either way. Bauer 
(2004), Byoun (2008), and later Białek-Jaworska and Nehrebecka (2014) also made a 
case that firms achieve tax-shield-like benefits via other payments, such as 
depreciation and interest payments related to operational leasing procedures, which 
may actually limit debt-related tax benefits and discourage debt itself. 
Firm liquidity may be considered as contradiction in itself: on the one hand, it 
is desirable as a firm’s ability to service short-term payments increases and limits the 
risk of defaulting with more cash on hand. On the other hand, liquidity reserves serve 
as an internal source of financing, limiting its need for debt. As regards transition and 
emerging economies, Myers and Rajan (1998)’s early evidence, in line with the logic 
behind the hierarchy of financing sources, implied that trade credit rationing became 
more likely when liquidity-related agency costs ran high. Moreover, overly liquid 
firms may be perceived as mismanaged in regard to long-term investment decisions. 
In addition to building up liquidity reserves, firms also mitigate their credit risk 
with tangible assets (at least in advanced economies). This obvious correlation 
becomes somewhat less obvious in the transition context, where we need to consider 
inefficient institutional frameworks to understand why contract enforcement is weak, 
if it exists at all. In such an environment, Nivorozkhin (2005) argued that the positive 
influence of firm tangible assets on debt may well become neutral, if not downright 
negative. He, and later Delcoure (2007), both made a case that if a default occurred, 
the costs related to the recovery of the collateral surpassed its market value. De Haas 
and Peters (2006)’s and Joeveer (2013)’s evidence also implied that substandard 
collateral was often used for financing, especially in the case of trade credit and long-
standing relationships with suppliers. Such results also suggested that trade credit was 
a more accessible source of short-term financing. 
Research on profits and firm growth in advanced economies usually recognise 
the opportunities related to future (or present) international presence. This particular 
facet of firm growth, which at the same time helps approximate the level of revenue 
sources’ diversification is often found missing in the transition context. We assume 
that the greater the number of markets a company provides its goods to, the lower its 
probability of revenue contraction and better chance for profits (via diversification). It 
logically follows that such a company would enjoy greater creditworthiness and 
mitigated risk of default and is able to both raise equity and incur bank-originated loans 
on more favourable terms. 
2.2 Institutional and Macroeconomic Factors 
We have already hinted at the fact that certain irregularities observed in the case 
of firm-level characteristics may often be explained by the differing impact of 
institutional and macroeconomic factors. Issues pertaining to legal regime, property 
rights development, and political stability have been researched thoroughly in the last 
few decades, mainly in cross-country comparative analyses. For example, La Porta et 
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al (1997, 1999)’s seminal papers suggested that weaker investor protection 
mechanisms tended to appear in countries with smaller financial markets. Pistor et al. 
(2000) and Buchanan and English (2007) highlighted the importance of the quality of 
theoretical frameworks in the financial development; moreover, Sarkar (2010)’s 
results showcased the superiority of common over civil law systems, as the former 
appeared less prone to become influenced by the legislature and so better guaranteed 
investors’ rights. 
The extant literature also acknowledges that even the best institutional regime 
requires a healthy and robust financial market to translate facilitation into economic 
growth (over both short and longer time horizons). Such sound development is only 
possible when financial markets are deep and liquid, so that the effects of informational 
opacity may be made less severe and costs of raising long-term external financing are 
lower (Beck and Levine 2008; Gupta and Yuan 2009, Hasan Wachtel and Zhou 2009, 
Hartwell 2014). Nonetheless, Hartwell (2014)’s evidence may serve as a warning 
against stock market domination, as it may actually either limit or reverse institutional 
reforms and weaken property rights. Additionally, although a competitive banking 
industry has been shown to limit borrowing costs (Demirgüç-Kunt, Maksimovic 
1999), it needs to be noted that stock and banking markets, according to Yartley 
(2010)’s evidence, complement each other, as banks provide financing up to a certain 
point in economic development beyond which equity takes over. 
Equity and banking markets, as well as institutional development, all require a 
modicum of macroeconomic stability to contribute to economic growth. This stability 
is usually the domain of the government or a central bank and is directly related to 
fiscal and monetary policies. Macroeconomic mismanagement (resulting in high and 
volatile inflation) has only one possible conclusion: elevated uncertainty during 
lengthy periods. Such an environment discourages not only borrowing but any kind of 
business activity short of speculation. A case can be made though that higher expected 
inflation may actually encourage greater debt, as borrowing terms become more 
favourable. On the other hand, stable and low inflation (as that experience by Poland 
during her transition) can be disregarded by firms in their financing decisions (Kędzior 
2012). 
All these factors we have so far discussed contribute to economic growth, but 
they do not capture the driving force behind firm performance. In this light, the 
hierarchy of financing suggests that more prosperous times may provide more 
resources, so that internal financing becomes more practicable. However, dynamic 
economic growth boosts investment opportunities and often leads to higher debts, 
incurred when money was cheap. In other words, even in relation to institutional and 
macroeconomic theories, traditional theories of firm financing offer no consensus. 
Establishing which operated better in the context of Poland is the goal of the rest of 
the paper. 
3. Model and Data 
To test the effectiveness of the traditional capital structure theories, we have 
compiled a new unbalanced annual dataset encompassing firm-level, institutional, and 
macroeconomic variables for 259 Polish non-financial entities from 2007 to 2015 (data 
obtained from NOTORIA SERWIS, a provider of firm-level financial data for listed 
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companies). The sample is diversified in terms of firm-specific characteristics, with 
the core criterion for inclusion of a firm in the sample being its continuous presence 
on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) from 2007 to 2015. We consciously decided 
to avoid differentiation in terms of firm size, growth, or profitability at this stage so 
that the firm-level data could present the fullest picture of Polish non-financial business 
sector. 
Our database is supplemented with macroeconomic and institutional indicators 
obtained from the World Bank, the European Central Bank, and Stooq databases (see 
Table A1 in the Appendix for a full description of variables and sources). We focus on 
the total and short-term leverage ratios, the latter of which we further decompose into 
bank-originated and trade loans. Since long-term bank debt constituted on average 7% 
of total assets, we decided to focus on the dominant form of external financing. The 
corporate leverage is shaped by limited and costly access to long-term bank financing, 
therefore trade credit of both maturities often replaces the unavailable bank loans. To 
the best of our knowledge such approach has been absent in recent papers regarding 
Poland. Detailed decomposition of corporate debt in the observed period allows for a 
much more in-depth analysis and provides a novel contribution to the existing 
literature. 
Given the pervasive endogeneity of variables in relation to each other, we 
employ a dynamic panel model controlling for firm heterogeneity, collinearity, and 
endogeneity. We estimate two versions of the model using a 2-step system general 
method of moments (SYS-GMM) estimator3. In the first model, we use all variables 
contemporaneously; however, given that our hypothesis is that firm capital structure is 
a function of firm-specific expectations about investments and market opportunities in 
future periods, our second model lags all right-hand variables to capture this effect. To 
capture unobserved time-related effects, we also experimentally introduce a time 
dummy and hope that this approach may also help alleviate possible endogeneity 
issues. 
As the SYS-GMM estimator requires that variables be mean stationary, we 
performed appropriate tests on our data (see Table A3 in the Appendix for the unit root 
tests). As can be seen, the null hypothesis of presence of a unit root has been rejected 
for all the variables tested. Additionally, cross-sectional dependence, stemming from 
the fact that firms operate in a common environment, might occur within this dataset. 
Theoretically, cross-sectional dependence may be identified by application of the LM 
statistic by Breusch and Pagan (1980), but Pesaran (2004) and Pesaran, Ullah, and 
Yamagata (2008) all make a case the LM statistic is likely to have very poor size 
properties when N is relatively large, which is the case with our dataset. Ideally, to 
solve the issue of dependence, one would need to resort to spatial modelling or factor 
structural approach (e.g. Driscoll and Kraay 1998, which has the added problem of 
requiring a time series of T>50). However, Sarafidis and Wansbeek (2012) provide a 
sweeping overview of the relevant literature, concluding that, in the case of spatial 
dependence, standard panel data estimators can still provide robust inferences on the 
                                                             
3 We also obtained preliminary results using a difference-GMM approach (DIF-GMM); however, given the 
scope of the paper and limited efficiency of the DIF-GMM estimator (the relevant literature, e.g. Baltagi 
2013 recommends a less restrictive estimator), we have concentrated on using a system-GMM approach 
instead. Difference-GMM results are available upon request. 
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parameters. Thus, while we acknowledge the probability of cross-sectional 
dependence with our data, we believe that the numerous robustness checks serve as a 
preliminary corroboration of the stability of the obtained results. 
In addition to ensuring stationarity and mitigating cross-sectional dependence, 
certain other conditions need to be met to guarantee consistency of the results, namely 
no second-order correlation in the first-differenced residuals and no correlation 
between the chosen instruments and the residuals (Arellano, Bover 1995, Blundell, 
Bond 1998). Roodman (2009a, 2009b) warns against instrument proliferation, which 
may prevent elimination of endogeneity. However, the very issue of how many 
instruments exactly should be used is debatable. We discuss the quality of the obtained 
models in Sections 4 and 5, but we should expect to observe some differences in the 
results due to variations in econometric techniques (Doornik, Hendry 2013). 
Our central equation is: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑌𝑖,(𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝐹 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝐹 + 𝛽𝐼 ∗ 𝑋𝑡
𝐼 + 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖,(𝑡−1) is the one-period lagged appropriate leverage ratio; 𝛽𝐹  stands for 
a vector of firm-level features described by 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝐹 ; 𝛽𝐼 is a vector of institutional variables 
described by 𝑋𝑡
𝐼 and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is an error term incorporating firm-specific effects. All these 
variables, along with the ones included in the robustness checks, are described in Table 
A1 (see Appendix). Table A2 in the Appendix provides summary statistics of our 
variables. To minimize the presence of outliers we transform the data by setting all the 
outlying observations to the 1st and 99th percentiles. We also include a 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡  dummy 
to control for the impact of the Great Financial Crisis; in the literature, this is usually 
taken to encompass between 2007 and 2010, but, following the approach of Jackowicz 
et al. (2016), we set the crisis period in Poland as 2008 to 2011.  
In addition to dynamic panel models, using lagged firm-level variables, we 
estimate two cross-sectional models using Ordinary Least Squares with standard errors 
consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity (OLS SE) for the years 2008 and 2015. 
In doing so we realise that we lose the country-specific macroeconomic and 
institutional effects. These, however, we may gauge by observing if, and then how, the 
impact of firm-level variables changes throughout the period. The observed shifts may 
then be ascribed to changes in external conditions. 
4. Institutional Setting 
The main issue regarding the choice of the firm’s debt ratio is the use of 
market versus book data. Since the former are more reliable approximations of future 
cash flows and risk, they should suit our analysis on corporate capital structure policy. 
Indeed, the use of market value is an optimal solution for advanced economies, where 
there are no issues in obtaining high-quality firm-level financial data. However, in 
transition and post-transition economies, the use of market value is more difficult, due 
to data scarcity, thus we choose to use book data instead. While book value may present 
its own set of problems, Polish book value has the advantage that all firms listed on 
the WSE need to conform to certain universal reporting standards. Therefore, we are 
fairly confident that our use of book value does approximate the “true” value of the 
debt. 
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Table A4 in the Appendix provides a snapshot of the annual averages of debt 
ratios in Poland, as well as information on the institutional data. The observed valued 
of debt ratios are relatively low throughout the whole period, suggesting firms faced 
constraints to external financing, especially in regard to institutional financial 
intermediaries. In fact, all of the financial system development indicators shown 
support this supposition. In particular, banking sector development in Poland lagged 
far behind advanced economies over the last years of the analysis and, given relatively 
low level of domestic credit (DCRED), it would be unsurprising if the impact of this 
variable were neutral (or even negative) in terms of shaping corporate debt policies 
(see Sawicka, Tymoczko 2014). Market capitalisation of domestic firms relative to 
Poland’s GDP (MCAP) was low throughout the whole period, with a dramatic drop in 
the mean value of total assets in 2008 (a likely lagged result of the financial meltdown 
observed globally). The recorded values imply a rapid stock market recovery, whose 
reflection we hope to observe on corporate capital structure.4  
The WDI strength of legal rights indicator for Poland (SoLR) did not diverge 
substantially from other CEE economies (Doing Business Reports 2007-2015) and 
implied medium debt contract-enforceability combined with limited access to credit. 
Given the empirical results provided by Nivorozhkin (2004; 2005), we hypothesize 
that the impact of firm collateral may be neutral. We also analyse two alternative 
continuous measures of institutional efficacy: contract-intensive money (CIM) and 
WGI Rule of Law (RoL). All three followed a similar path. In particular, the WDI 
indicator recorded a discrete jump between 2009 and 2010 and stabilised thereafter; 
CIM and RoL rose continuously throughout the period and reached their respective 
maxima of 88.14% and 82% in 2014. Shortening of the period of enforcing contracts 
from 980 to 830 to 685 days documented advancement in institutional framework 
firstly by implementation of stricter rules of procedure and then by amendment of the 
civil procedure code and appointment of more judges to commercial courts. As a result, 
Poland moved closer to the OECD high-income frontier of 553 days. These legislative 
manoeuvres regarding property rights, insolvency resolution, and contract 
enforcement seem to be getting better and closer to EU standards. On the other hand, 
the lagging development of the financial sector places the economy far behind the 
standards set by advanced economies. 
5. Results 
The quality of each model specification is to our satisfaction: the independent 
variables are jointly statistically significant at the 1% level and we observed no second-
order correlation; the Sargan test results suggest that the application of lagged variables 
as instruments was a correct choice. Since the selection and viability of instruments is 
crucial, and Roodman (2009b) warns about the over-proliferation of instruments, we 
limited the number of instruments so that they matched the number of variables. All 
models were estimated using finite sample corrected standard errors (Windmeijer 
2005) and are presented in Table 1 below: 
                                                             
4 An additional plausible explanation for these low debt ratios is also that Polish companies tend to replace 
bank loans with trade credit from their suppliers and contractors; there is evidence (Petersen, Rajan 1997, 
Nivorozkhin 2004) that this has in fact been the case in Poland in the past. 
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Firstly, we observe a somewhat self-evident correlation between current and 
lagged firm debt ratios. Contrary to our expectations, the firm current debt appears to 
be negatively correlated with firm size. We conjecture, based on this finding, that 
preferential treatment of large companies of a certain “social status” (leftover from the 
pre-transition period) is limited. Alternatively, this can be taken as evidence that as 
firms grow and their opacity decreases, companies may substitute short-term external 
financing with internal funding or turn to equity. At this stage, we observe a neutral 
impact of collateral, which lends viability to the results from Nivorozkhin (2004) on 
the neutral or negative correlation between tangible assets and leverage. 
It further appears that firms veer towards other forms of financing as their 
revenues increase – though we have scant proof that they switch to bank financing, we 
conjecture that greater revenues translate into greater creditworthiness. We also 
observe a miniature shift in the corporate debt structure– with every 1% of its sales 
growth, the total current debts grow by a minute 0.00008%. The obtained results also 
suggest a staggering difference in the strength with which the firm’s degree of 
openness correlates with the total debt and total short-term debt: while a 1% change in 
the firm’s international presence may bring about a 0.07% decrease in its current bank 
liabilities, it also appears to precipitate 0.17% and 0.15% drops in its total and total 
current debt levels respectively. While the disparity in the sheer force of impact 
remains puzzling, the general result aligns with the logic behind the hierarchy of 
financing sources. It is probable that such firms either depend on retained profits as 
source of financing or procure funds from providers beyond the domestic credit market 
more often than companies which operate nationally. 
Surprisingly, the current results also seem to confirm the somewhat doubtful 
attractiveness of tax shields in the transition business climate. In this light, we could 
make a case that although the recent financial crisis may not have hit Poland’s 
economy with full force, it did destabilise Polish listed firms’ profits and predicted 
more uncertainty in the following years – statistics retrieved from Notoria Serwis 
imply that profits, measured as ROA dropped from the 12% on average in 2007 to 
0.36% in 2010 and wavered between 3% and 2% in the last two years of our timeframe. 
Moreover, it appears that corporate ROE performed even less spectacularly – in 2007 
it reached an average of only -49%, skyrocketing to 27% in 2009 and evening out at 
around 9% afterwards. 
If considered as a measure of how securable a company’s assets are (Bradley et 
al. 1984), growth in a depreciation shield by 1% appears to boost a firm’s debt ratios 
by a maximum of 0.06% (depending on which debt ratio is being considered). This 
also points, if somewhat indirectly, to the quality (and availability) of assets used to 
collateralise debts. 
The inverse relationship between the equity market development and the firm’s 
total and short-term leverage ratios appears to also confirm that, even in the transition 
context, deeper stock markets encourage companies to issue their own stocks in place 
of incurring new long-term debts (provided that equity markets are taken as the highest 
form of financial sector development (Goldsmith 1969). Additionally, the 
development and size of the banking sector proved insignificant, a point highlighted 
earlier by Jõeveer (2013). Given that the Polish banking sector can be described as not 
only inaccessible but also reliant on relatively uncomplicated activities, the outcome 
of the current analysis is unsurprising. As a final note, at least as far as this part of the 
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analysis is concerned, it seems that while the crisis may have had a positive impact on 
trade credit, making it a go-to means of financing, the business cycle’s impact appears 
have been already captured by growth opportunities and market capitalization. Even 
though Poland has made substantial institutional progress as part of its transition, the 
observed neutral effects of collateral and the growing number of bankruptcies indicate 
that changes in legal reforms did not influence firms’ policies significantly. 
Estimation using lagged variables 
As a preliminary robustness check we lagged all right-hand variables to better 
avoid possible endogeneity issues. We discuss the obtained results, presented in detail 
in Table 2 below, by comparing them with the baseline estimation outcomes. 
Under this specification, it appears that firm size limits its need for total debt, 
as its impact is greater than the initial result: a 1% change in firm size brings about a 
drop of 1.58% in corporate total debt. However, larger companies appear to have more 
use for trade credit, even though the changes caused by a 1% growth of firm total assets 
results in a very slight upward change in trade credit (a minute +0.0046%). Previously, 
we observed a neutral impact of collateral, which appeared to underpin the hypothesis 
regarding the supposed institutional weakness regarding contract enforcement. 
Currently, tangibility seems to play an important and positive role in shaping firm 
financing decisions, at least as far as total and current banking liabilities are concerned. 
Interestingly, we note that its direction and magnitude of impact change, when we 
consider firm trade credit, in which case a 1% growth in firm tangibility results in a 
slight downward shift of trade credit (of about 0.0258%). These results, taken together 
with the initial model specification may be grounds for further in-depth analysis of the 
role and quality of firm collateral in corporate financing decisions. While not pointing 
exactly to the weakness of contract enforcement procedures, the current outcome does 
not corroborate fully Poland’s institutional progress (at least not to the point it is 
theoretically declared – see Section 3 for details). 
Firm profits recorded in the previous year turn out to boost its credit demand: 
while the general liabilities ratio appears to be the most sensitive to profitability 
changes (as it grows by 0.195% with every one percent change in firm profitability), 
shifts in short-term non-bank financing (as evidenced by trade credit) go up only 
slightly (by 0.045%). We note one more significant difference, as far as firm-specific 
variables are concerned, namely a negative impact of firm depreciation shield on trade 
credit – it’s influence may be classified as slight, with only a 0.06% drop in trade credit 
with every 1% of growth in depreciation shield benefits but we conjecture it enough to 
render this particular result inconclusive and requiring more further in-depth analysis. 
Moving on to firm-external factors, we begin by discussing the influence of 
institutional strengths of the Polish economy, which, in this model specification 
appears as relatively strong (a +2.27% growth in firm liabilities for every one percent 
change in contract enforcement and strength of legal rights), albeit limited only to firm 
total liabilities. Next, market capitalization seems to mitigate firm demand for total 
current liabilities (already recorded in the previous model specification), but it also 
seems to boost firm demand for short-term non-bank financing, however slightly. As 
a final comment, based on the results we conjecture that the lagged crisis dummy 
generally mitigated firm desire for trade credit – the outcome is not entirely unexpected 
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given the fact that the previous specification (using current variables) highlighted the 
negative impact of the past occurrences related to the financial crisis in firm financing 
decisions. 
Estimation using OLS SE 
We now turn to the OLS SE estimation procedures which we performed for the 
years 2008 and 2015 using lagged firm-level variables. The results of this exercise are 
presented in Tables 3 and 4 below. It appears that firm size correlated positively with 
total and bank liabilities in 2008 but in 2015 it started to dampen firm demand for 
external financing (at least as far as total and current liabilities were concerned). On 
the other hand, in 2015 larger companies appeared to have greater use for trade credit. 
It is worth noting that firm collateral mitigated corporate demand for current liabilities 
and remained neutral towards other liabilities ratios in 2008, however, we captured its 
negative impact on trade credit in 2015. The shift from natural to negative may reflect 
deterioration in “realised” contract enforcement and weakening of institutional 
structures. The results for firm profitability turned out less controversial, as throughout 
2008 more profitable firms found more use for total, current and trade liabilities, 
limiting their use of short-term bank financing. This tendency reappeared in 2015, 
albeit in a limited form: more profitable companies incurred higher total and current 
debts with the exception of trade credit, which they seemed to avoid. It follows that 
more profitable companies might have been able to obtain cheaper external financing 
as they appeared more as more reliable. On the other hand, it seems that in 2008 firm 
liquidity directly mitigated corporate demand for external financing, an effect which 
appeared to wane as time progressed as in 2015 only trade credit appeared limited by 
firm available liquid resources. Nonetheless, such an outcome steers us towards the 
hierarchy of financing sources theory, contrary to the majority of results obtained for 
firm profitability. As a final comment at this stage, a positive correlation between firm 
non-tax debt shield and total, current, and short-term bank liabilities may serve as a 
tentative confirmation of the previously obtained results and of the quality of collateral 
used in debt contracts. 
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5.1 Robustness Checks 
To maximize the robustness of our analysis, we expand the baseline equation 
estimated with the SYS-GMM estimator by adding three macro variables capturing the 
size of the national government (government subsidies and other transfers), and 
institutional changes regarding insolvency resolution and liquidation of a company 
(recovery rate). Furthermore, we replace the initial discrete institutional measure with 
either contract-intensive money (CIM) or the World Governance Indicators (WGI) 
Rule of Law measure. Given the results of the preliminary robustness check discussed 
above, we only use current variables (non-lagged). Tables A5-A8 in the Appendix 
present the results. 
Total Liabilities 
Both the direction and statistical significance have been retained for all the firm-
level variables except for the company’s internationalisation. Similarly, 
macroeconomic variables remain unchanged in terms of their impact and statistical 
significance. CIM impacts total debt positively, corroborating our earlier results and 
indicating that property rights enable more debt financing. Substituting CIM with the 
WGI indicator has little impact on our variables of interest, although international 
macroeconomic conditions turn statistically significant (and their impact on total debt 
is negative, as expected). In contrast, the domestic market capitalisation becomes 
insignificant (Table A5 Column 6 in the Appendix). 
Current Liabilities 
Unfortunately, the model specification for current liabilities performs very 
poorly across each combination of variables. Inclusion of CIM (Table A6, Columns 1-
3) yields low explanatory power, implying that some of Williams and Siddique 
(2008)’s arguments may be accurate. The WGI indicator performs better, and, with the 
exception of firm internationalisation, all the company-level variables remain 
unchanged relative to the initial results. Indeed, the impact of the rule of law remains 
uniformly positive and significant, with the exception of the last equation. which yields 
a relatively poor model fit. In none of the six versions estimated for the current 
liabilities ratio are the new control variables significant.  
Current Bank Liabilities 
Next, we turn to current bank liabilities (Table A7). In tandem with CIM 
(Columns 1-3), the firm’s growing profits appear to diminish its demand for external 
financing It seems that increased growth opportunities demand more short-term 
financial support. The negative influence of the tax shield persists, its magnitude 
unchanged. Domestic equity market becomes a significant source of financing, 
although the result is fragile and should be treated with care – indeed, when we replace 
CIM with the WGI indicator (Columns 4-6), it loses its impact altogether. It seems that 
government subsidies might play a role in shaping the demand for short-term bank 
financing regardless of the institutional measure applied (Columns 2 and 5). This issue 
requires both careful interpretation and, in light of the mostly neutral results obtained 
in this paper, further research clarifying its impact on company debt policies. 
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Trade Credit 
Shifting from the discrete to the continuous measure of property rights causes 
the previously-neutral firm’s profitability and growth opportunities to have a positive 
influence on the trade credit ratio (Table A8). At the same time, the firm’s size loses 
its initial impact, with only the last specification (Table A8, Column 3) indicating its 
influence. We note that government subsides might indeed be a significant factor 
shaping not only the firm’s demand for bank-originated by also trade credit. With the 
trade credit being less demanding in terms of procedures and contract enforcement, 
and veering toward relationship lending, it is unsurprising that the impact of the 
country’s institutional development becomes slightly less pronounced. Evidence from 
Marzec and Pawłowska (2012) supports these results, as their analysis provided proof 
that firms indeed substitute bank loans with easier manageable trade credit.   
The above exercise confirms that institutional changes have a lasting influence 
on the firm’s debt (although CIM as a proxy for property rights appears slightly inferior 
to the both subjective indices, a trait we ascribe to low frequency of the data used to 
calculate the ratio). Firm international presence, as well as general domestic and 
international macroeconomic conditions seem to shape the demand for debt of any 
kind only marginally, especially when compared to the robust impact of institutional 
development. We surmise that this is a reflection of the limited international presence 
and low debt levels of Polish listed companies. In either case, institutional indicators 
appear to dominate in terms of significance and size of their effect. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper analysed the institutional and microeconomic determinants of total 
and current debt over the period 2007 to 2015 in Poland. Using a new dataset of 
macroeconomic, institutional, and firm-level annual variables gathered for over 200 
public companies quoted on the WSE, we provided new evidence on changes in the 
determinants of internal and external corporate capital structure. Our results 
highlighted that Polish firms still favoured short-term over long-term external funding 
and continued to choose trade credit over bank loans. The dataset allowed us to divide 
short-term debt according to its source, and the empirical analysis showed differences 
in the strength and direction of impact of these various determinants of capital 
structure. 
Despite transitioning successfully from a centrally-planned to a market 
economy, Poland has retained some of its traits from the early 1990s. Among these, 
the most prominent were the questionable efficiency of the firm’s collateral in 
shielding lenders from debt-related agency conflicts and a negligible impact of both 
short-term interest rates and the development of the banking sector on capital structure. 
In fact, an inverse relation between tax shields and leverage pointed to expected 
volatility if not downright uncertainty of profits. While we could probably ascribe this 
phenomenon to the financial turmoil observed within our timeframe, this in itself was 
testimonial of Poland’s lingering transition-like traits. We therefore supported the 
claim that firm-level variables impacted various debt ratios differently. 
Even though empirical research has suggested that firm passive behaviour in 
terms of incurring loans (the discouraged borrower phenomenon) may be more 
characteristic of small and medium companies, our results suggest that in the recent 
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period the discouraged borrower attitude may have appeared among listed entities. 
Looking at the presented analysis we hypothesize that this may be caused by at least 
two issues. Firstly, even though listed companies are expected to be better-managed in 
terms of growth and investment, the transition reality and the current evidence on firm 
profits proves that it is not always the case. Secondly, as far as firm-external factors 
are concerned, company cooperation with credit institutions may be a contributing 
factor. Given the neutral role of the banking sector in financing decisions we might 
conjecture that too short a credit history and/or non-existent relationship with banks 
could be a significant obstacle in obtaining external financing. The reason for such 
insufficient cooperation should not be always ascribed to firms and their low 
creditworthiness, but also – and in the transition context especially so – to weak and 
ineffective institutional frameworks, insufficient contract enforcement, and the costs 
these factors generate. 
Institutional development, so far disregarded by empirical studies concerning 
Poland, emerged as a highly important determinant of corporate capital structure, 
especially the development and sophistication of equity markets and the legal system. 
The evolution of property rights, captured by three various indicators, affected the debt 
ratios positively, but their effects appeared to be so far too weak to transform assets 
into effective instruments used in debt contracts. Our evidence also suggested that the 
rate of recovery during insolvency resolutions and the number of bankruptcies 
remained irrelevant to corporate debt levels. 
In terms of non-results, monetary policy expectations, the development of the 
banking sector, and government subsidies to the private sector appeared to have little 
to no influence on corporate debt policy choices. The neutrality of the short-term 
interbank interest rate might be explained by the scarcity of credit ratings among 
companies and their inactivity in issuing corporate securities, hence the inter-bank 
rates impacted their capital structures to a very limited extent. If combined with the 
(mostly insignificant) effect of GDP changes, it appeared that the economic situation 
in Poland was stable enough to vitiate the influence of economic growth, interest rate 
changes, and inflation on firm debt. The afore-mentioned insignificance of the banking 
sector could be associated with a number of reasons, among which we discussed earlier 
the documented low demand for bank loans and a generally weakly developed banking 
system are most likely. 
As a final note, we acknowledge that several issues require further in-depth 
analysis. Firstly, empirical results remain unconvincing and therefore inconclusive 
regarding firm tangibility and depreciation shields. Secondly, this paper has focused 
on publicly-traded companies. There are numerous ways in which our research could 
inspire further analyses, either by using higher-frequency data or constructing a sample 
encompassing both public and private firms during a longer period. This paper has 
attempted only to examine a small slice of the corporate structure pie in Poland, and 
much more can be done. 
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